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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the role of stratification in the rise of endogeneity bias in multilevel 
models. The theory is illustrated using educational stratification and its implication on the 
estimation of multilevel education production functions. Educational stratification results 
from the functioning of the education market; it transforms a continuum of student 
characteristics into a continuum of tuition fees. These fees enter students’ utility functions and 
determine the school they attend and its quality. In other words, student characteristics are the 
major determinants of school quality and the two are correlated. In this paper, I analyse how 
these correlations arise and what are their implications for multilevel estimation of education 
production functions. The major problem posed by such correlations is cross-level 
endogeneity bias. The theory developed in this paper can be extended to any economic 
phenomenon that exhibits stratification or nesting of smaller units within larger units (e.g. 
employees within firms, residents within neighbourhoods, etc).  
 
 
 
JEL Classification: I20, C02, D70. 
Keywords: Stratification, Endogeneity Bias, Multilevel Models, Education production 
functions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Tarek Mostafa: The Institute of Education - University of London. Centre for Longitudinal Studies (CLS - 
ESRC). 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL. England, United Kingdom. Office phone: +44 (0)2076126881. 
Email: T.Mostafa@ioe.ac.uk.  
2 
 
Introduction. 
The efficiency of multilevel models is threatened by the existence of endogeneity bias 
resulting from omitted variables. Endogeneity bias arises when unobserved or omitted 
variables, that affect the outcome, are correlated with one or more of the included independent 
variables. The presence of such bias in the estimation of panel data models has been 
recognized for a long time, and econometricians such as Mundlak (1978) and Maddala (1987) 
provided different solutions to tackle it. However, the study of endogeneity was not extended 
to other similar structures such as multilevel models. Note that panel models and multilevel 
models bear some similarity since, in the former, time observations are nested within the same 
individual and in the latter individuals are nested within larger units (e.g. students nested 
within schools, residents within neighbourhoods, etc). 
 
Multilevel models - also known as hierarchical models, nested models, or mixed models - are 
concerned with phenomena where observations are nested within larger units. They have been 
used in a variety of contexts such as longitudinal models (e.g. individuals observed at 
different points in time), organizational research (e.g. individuals nested within firms), spatial 
and urban economics (e.g. residents nested within neighbourhoods or regions), educational 
research (e.g. students nested within schools), and in biometric, environmental and ecological 
studies. 
 
In this paper, I am constructing a theoretical model that assesses the implications of 
stratification on endogeneity bias in the estimation of multilevel models. The theory is 
illustrated using education production functions where students are nested within schools. I 
chose this example because it is one of the most well known areas of application of multilevel 
modelling and because multilevel data is becoming more widely available (e.g. OECD’s 
PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS, etc). In this context, endogeneity is caused by educational 
stratification which ties school characteristics to those of the student. In other words, students 
from a lower income and social strata are likely to be stratified into low-quality schools which 
are populated by students of similar type. This correlation between student and school 
characteristics leads to endogeneity if some of the school-level or student-level variables are 
omitted while being correlated with the included independent variables from the other level 
(Hanchane and Mostafa; 2012). Note that even though the theory is illustrated using an 
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educational example, it can be extended to any economic phenomenon that exhibits 
stratification or nesting of smaller units within larger units. 
 
The theoretical model is built upon the work of Epple and Romano (1998). An economy 
populated with individuals differentiated by income, ability and social status is considered. 
This economy has an arbitrarily fixed number of public, private and mixed finance schools 
and school quality depends on funding, ability and social peer effects. The latter are 
considered to be non-linear in their means. Note that linearity in means was criticized in 
Hoxby and Weingarth (2005). Schools maximize their profits under several quality 
constraints. This maximization transforms a continuum of student characteristics into a 
continuum of admission prices or tuition fees. In order to be admitted into a private school a 
student has to pay tuition fees that cover his marginal cost. In contrast, in public schools this 
marginal cost is covered entirely by public funds, and in mixed finance schools both tuition 
fees and public funds are used to cover the marginal cost of admitting a new student. In 
comparison with Epple and Romano (1998), non-linear peer effects, mixed finance schools 
and school funding are introduced.   
 
The theoretical literature on stratification emerged in the 1970s with the founding articles of 
Barzel (1973) and Stiglitz (1974), and the major developments took place in the 1990s, when 
two distinct bodies of literature emerged. The first studied spatial stratification between 
jurisdictions and neighbourhoods. It includes De Bartolome (1990), Epple, Filimon, and 
Romer (1993), Nechyba (1997), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), and Epple and Platt (1998). 
The second studied educational stratification between public and private schools. It includes 
Arnott and Rowse (1987), Epple and Romano (1998, 2006) and Nechyba (2003). Further, the 
recent econometric literature studying endogeneity problems includes Wooldridge (2002), 
Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004), Fielding (2004), Snijders and Berkhof (2006), Kim and 
Frees (2006), Grilli and Rampichini (2006), Hanchane and Mostafa (2012). 
 
The Theoretical Model. 
 
In this model, we consider an economy populated with a continuum of households 
differentiated by income, social status and student ability. Social status is defined as a proxy 
for factors such as social class, cultural possessions, and parental education. All these factors 
are represented through a scalar . Social status is taken into account to shed light on how 
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school quality is affected by the social mix of enrolled students. Each household has parents 
and one student and forms a single decision making unit. Henceforth, “student” and 
“household” are used interchangeably. 
 
A student i  has an income iy , an ability ib  and a social status ik . Note that i  may designate a 
particular student or a type of students with the same combination of ,  and . These 
students attend a finite number of schools. A school is designated by an index j  
(with ). 
 
Income, ability, and social status are distributed in the population according to the density 
function ),,( kybf  which is positive and continuous on its support 
),0(),0(),0( maxmaxmax kybS  . 
 
Student utility is assumed to be a function of private consumption and school quality. It is 
noted as ),( qcU , where c  is consumption and q  is school quality.  is increasing, strictly 
quasi-concave and twice continuously differentiable. Students can attend only one school and 
they cannot supplement education elsewhere. Educational achievements are given by the 
education production function ),( jii qbaa  ; a  is continuous and increasing in both 
arguments. Achievements depend on students’ abilities and on the quality of their school. In 
other words, the access to higher quality schools is translated into higher achievements. Note 
that this achievements function can be empirically modelled as a multilevel equation with two 
levels: students and schools. 
 
School quality is determined by expenditure per pupil, ability peer effects, social status peer 
effects and the dispersion of social status. Quality is increasing in all its arguments. It should 
be noted that we can reasonably assume that schools and policy makers appreciate social 
diversity within schools. However, one may think that parents with much social status prefer 
peers of the same type and hence quality should be decreasing in the dispersion of social 
status. This is not the case in this model and the problem is solved in two ways. On the one 
hand, schools maximize rents under a quality constraint which contains the dispersion of 
social status; so it is up to the schools to say whether school quality is increasing or not in this 
dispersion. On the other hand, high social status households who value social homogeneity 
may choose socially homogenous schools by paying higher tuition fees. A similar example 
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reflecting economic reality would be educational desegregation in the US. Authorities may 
impose ethnic diversity into white majority schools; however, white students can move to 
private non-diverse schools by paying more fees. In my model, authorities impose social 
diversity and then households choose a school according to their preferences (i.e. utility 
maximization).
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Ability peer effects are defined to be school average abilities, social status peer effects are 
defined to be school average social status, and the dispersion of social status is its within-
school variance. 
 
Three types of schools are considered: free public schools financed entirely by public funds, 
mixed finance schools financed by public funds and tuition fees paid by students and private 
schools financed solely by tuition fees.
3
 In this economy, all households pay taxes, even if 
their children do not attend public or mixed finance schools. The funds allocated to education 
are collected through a proportional income tax, and the number of students is larger than the 
number of schools. Note that both the number of students and schools in the economy is 
finite. 
 
The proportion of students of type  kyb ,,  in school j  is given by ),,( kybj , and the 
number of students in school j is given by jl .with: 

s
jj dbdydkkybfkybl ),,(),,(          (1) 
and  1,0),,( kybj  
 
Schools. 
 
The production cost of education depends on the number of students in a school; it is given by 
jjjjjj FlnlnFlVlCo 
2
21)()( . 0V , 0V . F is a fixed cost for school j  and 1n  
and 2n  are positive constants. Technical differences between schools are not included in the 
                                                 
2
 In this model, communities and geographical stratification are not considered for simplicity. Mostafa (2009a) 
provides a theoretical framework for spatial stratification.  
3
 Mixed finance schools represent government-dependent private schools controlled by non-government 
organizations or with governing boards not selected by a government agency that receive a considerable part of 
their core funding from government agencies. 
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model.
4
 The absence of economies of scale in the production of education is translated into a 
large number of schools catering for different types of students.
5
 Furthermore, schools have 
perfect information on students’ income, ability and social status. 
 
Schools are assumed to maximize profits under a quality constraint. Funding is provided by 
three sources: government subsidies, tuition paid by students and other earnings. 
 
        j
s
jij
s
jijj GdbdydkkybfkybpdbdydkkybfkybER   ,,,,,,,,   
jR  : School resources or revenues. 
ijE : Government subsidies for student i  attending school j . 
ijp : Tuition fees paid by student i  in school j . 
jG : Other earnings. 
The sum of subsidies for a particular school is equal to jij EE  . At equilibrium, the sum of 
government subsidies to all schools is equal to tax revenues in the economy   tYE j  with 
Y  being aggregate income (i.e. the budget is balanced). The tax rate is assumed to be 
exogenous. In some previous studies, tax rates were considered to be chosen through majority 
voting. However, the atomistic nature of the economy and the existence of political parties 
and complex political processes mean that majority voting over tax rates is unrealistic. 
Furthermore, the presence of public and private schools prevents the existence of a majority 
voting equilibrium due to the non-single peakedness of individual preferences over tax rates. 
Hence, in order to avoid this problem and to simplify the theoretical model, I am assuming the 
exogeneity of the tax rate.
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School quality is given by:  








 2,,, jjj
j
j
jj
l
R
qq           (2) 
                                                 
4
 This assumption was used in Epple and Romano 1998 (p.38).  
5
 Ferris and West (2004) provide evidence that large schools suffer from external and invisible costs “such as 
social problems that prevent the existence of economies of scale.” This is reflected through the positive sign of 
1n and 2n . 
6
 Mostafa (2009a) provides the conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium when preferences 
are non-single peaked.  
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with: 0lim
0


j
R
q
j
, 0lim
0


jq
j
, 0lim
0


jq
j
, 0lim
02


jq
j
. 
jq  is increasing in 
j
j
l
R
, j , j and 
2
j . where: 
Expenditure per pupil is given by 
j
j
l
R
. 
Ability peer effects are given by average abilities in a school: 
   
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybb
l
,,,,
1
        (3) 
Social status peer effects are given by average social status in a school: 
   
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybk
l
,,,,
1
        (4) 
The dispersion of social status in a school is given by its within-school variance: 
  
s
jji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybk
l
),,(),,(
1 22        (5) 
 
Ability peer effects, social status peer effects, the dispersion of social status and the number of 
enrolled students represent quality constraints under which school profit is maximized. Profit 
is equal to the difference between revenues and the cost of producing 
education )( jjj lCoR  . At equilibrium, profits are equal to zero and no new entries on the 
education market are possible.
7
 In this case, )( jj lCoR  . One should note that schools can 
decide on their level of quality and on the type of students they admit. However, the size of 
each student type in the economy is exogenous to the school and cannot be influenced by it.    
 
School profit maximization and price discrimination. 
Schools maximize profit under several quality constraints. Even if public schools do not 
charge tuition, the authorities condition the level of subsidies according to student types. For 
private and mixed finance schools, the chosen level of quality and the level of public 
subsidies determine the tuition for each type of students. It should also be noted that private 
and mixed finance schools do not select students directly, since they admit any student who is 
able to pay the price corresponding to his type. In fact, displaying a prohibitive price is 
equivalent to refusing to admit a student. The quality constraints include average abilities, 
                                                 
7
 As long as school profits are positive, new schools will enter the market. See Epple and Romano 1998 (p.39). 
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average social status, the dispersion of social status and the number of students attending a 
school. One should keep in mind that profit maximisation does not necessarily imply that 
schools are making an actual positive profit since profits will tend towards zero at 
equilibrium. Profit maximization is a mechanism that allows schools to optimize the 
allocation of resources which is also used by public schools which are non-profit schools. 
  
Schools maximize profit under several quality constraints. In other words, schools choose 
their level of quality and the proportion of each student type to admit j . However, schools 
are constrained by the size of each student type in the economy (sum of j across all schools). 
Said differently, the school will maximize its profits by selecting the right combination of 
student types that would fit its quality constraints bearing in mind that it cannot enrol more of 
a type than there is in the economy.  At equilibrium, all students will be sorted into schools 
and profits will be equal to zero (i.e. new schools will enter the market until profits are 
reduced to zero) and schools will no longer be able to modify their fees given that the size of 
each student type in the economy and school quality are held fixed.
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Profit maximisation can be written in the following form: 
FlVR jjj  )(max   
 
subject to the following constraints: 

s
jj dbdydkkybfkybl ),,(),,(         (1) 
   
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybb
l
,,,,
1
        (3) 
   
s
ji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybk
l
,,,,
1
        (4) 
  
s
jji
j
j dbdydkkybfkybk
l
),,(),,(
1 22        (5) 
These constraints can be transformed by replacing jl  by its value: 
                                                 
8
 Note that at equilibrium schools might adopt a dynamic behaviour where school quality is adjusted in order to 
attract students from other schools. This behaviour constitutes a form of competition based on quality and price 
which will lead to changes in the structure of tuition fees. Under this scenario some schools might be driven out 
of the market. However, such a time-dynamic framework is not built into this model for simplicity, but is worth 
investigating in the future. In this paper, school quality and the size of each student type are considered to be 
fixed. 
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1-           0,,,,,,,,  
s
ji
s
jj dbdydkkybfkybbdbdydkkybfkyb   
2-           0,,,,,,,,   
s s
jijj dbdydkkybfkybkdbdydkkybfkyb   
3-     0),,(),,(),,(),,( 22 
s
jji
s
jj dbdydkkybfkybkdbdydkkybfkyb   
The Lagrangian function is then written in the following form: 
       
       
  








 
 

s s
jjijjj
s s
jijjj
s
ji
s
jjjjjj
dbdydkkybfkybkdbdydkkybfkyb
dbdydkkybfkybkdbdydkkybfkyb
dbdydkkybfkybbdbdydkkybfkybFlnlnR
),,(),,(),,(),,(
],,,,,,,,[
],,,,,,,,[
22
2
21



with jjj and  ,,  the Lagrangian multipliers. 
Partial differentiation of the Lagrangian function over ),,( kybj  yields: 
   0)()(2
),,(
22
21
* 


jijjijjijjjj
j
kkblnnR
kyb


 
Note that schools maximise their profits by choosing the proportion ),,( kybj  of type (b, y, 
k) they enrol given the quality constraints and the size of this particular type of students in the 
economy.  
The optimal level of resources per student 
*
jR  is the following: 
  2221* )()(2 jijjijjijjjj kkblnnRMC      (6) 
Note that 
*
jR  represents the marginal cost (MC) of admitting a student of type ),,( kyb .  
Furthermore, *
*
ijijj pER   after the partial differentiation of 
        j
s
jij
s
jijj GdbdydkkybfkybpdbdydkkybfkybER   ,,,,,,,,  over ),,( kybj . 
The Lagrangian multipliers are: 
    


s
j
jj
j dbdydkkybfkyb
R
l
,,,,
1 *


  
    


s
j
jj
j dbdydkkybfkyb
R
l
,,,,
1 *
  
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    


s
j
jj
j dbdydkkybfkyb
R
l
,,,,
1
2
*


  
j , j  and j  are positive and they vary between schools. j  represents the change to 
resources per student deriving from a change in school average abilities j . j   represents the 
change to resources per student deriving from a change in school average social status j . 
j   represents the change to resources per student deriving from a change in the within-
school dispersion of social status 
2
j . The higher the multipliers are the stronger stratification 
is, since the higher the impact of individual characteristics on the marginal cost is. Note that if 
the multipliers are equal to zero, then the marginal cost of admitting a student will only 
depend on the number of students attending a school. In other words, student characteristics 
will not have any effect on the marginal cost and stratification according to ability and social 
status will not exist. 
 
In equation (6), 
*
jR  represents the resources needed to cover the marginal cost of admitting a 
student. The first term jlnn 21 2  is the part resulting from the education production cost 
(reflecting the impact of the number of students in a school). It is positive and identical for all 
students attending the same school. The second, third and fourth terms reflect the externality 
of one’s own ability and social status on the school and the cost resulting from them. 
 
The second term, )( ijj b  , represents the impact of one’s ability on school average 
abilities. Students with above average abilities ij b  have a negative externality cost on the 
school. The reverse is true for ij b . This term is decreasing in ib  given a value of j . 


)(lim ijj
b
b . 
 
The third term, )( ijj k , represents the impact of one’s social status on school average 
social status. Students with above average social status ij k  have a negative externality 
cost on the school. The reverse is true for ij k . This term is decreasing in ik  given a value 
of j . 

)(lim ijj
k
k . 
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The fourth term,   22 jijj k   , represents the cost of being too close to the average of 
social status. Those who are far from the mean (i.e. they create social diversity) represent a 
negative externality cost for the school. In other words, when ik is far enough (higher or 
lower) from j ,  
2
jik   is positive and high. If it is higher than 
2
j , then the term 
  22 jijj k   is negative. The reverse is true for ik close enough to j . This term, given 
constant values of 
2
j and j , is concave in ik  and attains its maximum at jik  . 
   

22lim jijj
k
k . 
 
Note that
*
jR  might be negative, depending on the level of government subsidies and the 
position of individual ability and social status relative to the means. Equation (6) represents a 
compensation scheme; low ability students subsidize higher ability ones, low social status 
students subsidize high social status ones and students with social status close to its average 
subsidize those who are far from the average (i.e. those who create social diversity). 
Furthermore, this equation indicates that the access to educational quality is conditioned by 
student characteristics. In other words, those who have low combinations of  kyb ,,  are the 
most disadvantaged since the market operates to their detriment (except that low k  students 
might be rewarded through the forth term of the equation). Note that the pricing function is 
not necessarily meritocratic. In fact, the second term is meritocratic since it rewards higher 
ability students, but the third term is not because it rewards students with higher social status. 
 
Equation (6) allows us to overcome the strict distinction between public and private schools. 
Different types of education finance can be considered: we can start with free admission 
public schools with 0ijp  for all i  and go through mixed finance schools where both p  and 
E  are positive and eventually reach purely private schools where 0ijE . 
When 
*
jR  is replaced by its value we obtain the following equations: 
 
For private schools, we have: 
  2221* )()(2 jijjijjijjjij kkblnnp  
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With 0ijE .
9
 
Note that 
*
ijp can be negative for some students (e.g. scholarship) but not for all, for the 
following reason: a private school cannot possibly offer scholarships for all its students. In 
order to offer a scholarship for one student, another has to pay a positive tuition fee. This can 
be seen through the sum of *ijp  which is always positive. 
            
 

j jjjj l
i
l
i
jijjijj
l
i
ijj
l
i
j
l
i
ij kkblnnp
1 1
22
11
21
1
* 02  since 
  02
1
21 

jl
i
jlnn  and 
          
 

j jj l
i
l
i
jijjijj
l
i
ijj kkb
1 1
22
1
0  
Mathematical details :  
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For mixed finance schools, we have: 
  2221* )()(2 jijjijjijjjijij kkblnnEp  
 
For mixed finance schools, the level of subsidy per student ijE  is determined by authorities 
and not by optimization. Schools can only choose the level of tuition to apply. Pricing is done 
according to the level of quality, the type and number of enrolled students and the level of 
subsidies. Note that theoretically it is possible to charge negative tuition fees (scholarships) 
for all students, if ijE  is positive and very high. However, this is unrealistic, since authorities 
                                                 
9
 Pricing is done according to the marginal cost of admitting a student. 
13 
 
would not subsidize schools to the extent that they could offer scholarships to all students. A 
necessary condition is: 00)2(
1
*
1
21  

jj l
i
ij
l
i
jij plnnE . 
For public schools, we have: 
  2221 )()(2 jijjijjijjjij kkblnnE  
  
With 0ijp  for all i . 
Given the quality of a public school, student types determine the amount of public funds 
needed to cover the marginal cost of admitting them. Public authorities determine the level of 
funds according to the type of enrolled students while maintaining an open enrolment policy. 
Note that ijE  can be negative for some students; however, 


jl
i
ijE
1
0  for the same 
aforementioned reasons.  
 
Students. 
 
Since public, mixed finance and private schools coexist, students have a large set of choices. 
They are price takers and they maximize their utility through school choice given their 
characteristics and school tuition fees. 
 
Utility maximization is done under the following budget constraint: ijii pytc  )1( , with t  
the tax rate. Note that the level of individual utility in the chosen school should at least be 
equal to the maximum utility that can be obtained elsewhere. The price taking assumption is 
given through the following property: 
     '' ,1,1 jijijiji qpytMaxUqpytU 
 
with j and 'j two schools with 'jj  . 
Utility maximization implies that students have to choose between consumption and tuition in 
order to attain the level of school quality that would maximize their utility function. Utility 
maximization yields the following indirect utility:  
 jijijjjijiiii qpytMaxUEkybW ,)1(),,,,,,( 2    
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This utility function indicates that student and school characteristics enter the function 
through the combination of price (tuition fees) and school quality. Furthermore, even though 
income is not part of the pricing function (equation 6), it affects utility maximisation through 
the budget constraint which determines which school is affordable. 
 
Describing students’ feasible choice sets: 
Consider two schools j and 'j ; the first offers a combination of tuition fees and 
quality  jij qp , to student i, and the second offers a combination  '', jij qp . If 
'ijij pp  and 'jj qq  , then only school 'j is part of the feasible choice set of student i, since no 
student would agree to pay a higher price for lower or equal quality. Hence, for each student, 
the feasible set of choices exhibits a hierarchy of tuition fees and quality levels. For j and 'j to 
be part of the choice set, 'ijij pp  and 'jj qq  must hold. Furthermore, private schools should 
have higher quality than public schools since no one would agree to pay tuition fees when it is 
possible to obtain a higher quality free of charge. Note that the choice of a particular school 
from the set depends on aforementioned utility maximization. 
 
The Implications of the Theory. 
 
First, school profit maximization transforms a continuum of student characteristics into a 
continuum of tuition fees through the pricing function (i.e. equation 6). Tuition fees inter the 
utility function through their impact on consumption and determine the educational quality 
that can be afforded (through student utility maximization). Hence, students are not randomly 
stratified into schools and stratification is determined by their ability, social status and 
income. This stratification mechanism is summarized through the pricing function. 
  2221* )()(2 jijjijjijjjj kkblnnRMC    
This function tells us that the marginal cost of a student and hence the tuition fees he has to 
pay are determined by his type. Given school quality and tuition fees, utility maximization 
determines which school a student will attend. Therefore, one can conclude that students are 
sorted into schools according to their type and to schools’ strategic behaviour on the 
education market. As mentioned before, the higher the Lagrangian multipliers are the higher 
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the level of stratification is. In other words, student characteristics will have a strong bearing 
on students’ marginal costs.  
 
Secondly, the education production function (EPF) ),( jii qbaa   not only tells us that 
achievements depend on student ability and school quality but it also says that school quality 
is determined by student type (since student type determines the school a student attends as 
explained before). Hence ib  and jq are correlated. And if ability is assumed to be correlated 
with income and social status, then the correlation between ib  and jq might even be stronger. 
Further, if the level of stratification is high (high values on the Lagrangian multipliers), then 
students stratified into the same school will bear some resemblance. This happens because 
students of the same type are likely to have similar choice sets and utility maximization is 
likely to lead them to the same schools. In fact, students with identical abilities, income and 
social status will have identical choice sets and identical tuition fees, (school quality held 
constant).   
 
Thirdly, from an econometric point of view, the theory implies that student and school 
characteristics are correlated and that causality goes from the first to the second. In fact, 
student endowments in ability, income and social status determine the quality of their school 
through utility maximization. This has major implications for any econometric estimation. 
Omitting some student or school characteristics may generate endogeneity bias, since these 
variables will be absorbed by the error term and the latter will be correlated with the included 
individual characteristics (independent variables). Moreover, the resemblance between 
students attending the same school warrants the use of multilevel modelling. 
 
Fourthly, this model can be extended to any multilevel phenomenon where level 1 units are 
expected to be stratified. For instance, the implications of this model can be extended to urban 
economics where households are stratified between neighbourhoods which differ in terms of 
their housing prices. In this case, stratification is determined by household characteristics and 
the functioning of the real-estate market. The model can also be extended to the analysis of 
industrial clusters where firms are stratified into geographical zones. Furthermore, the 
implications can be extended to the analysis of labour productivity where individuals are 
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stratified between firms based on their characteristics and on the functioning of the labour 
market. 
 
Finally, in this theoretical model I used a single economy populated by a continuum of 
households. However, this model can be extended to multiple economies. In these economies, 
the strength of educational stratification needs not be the same across all of them. In fact, in 
my model the Lagrangian multipliers define the strength of the variation in the marginal cost 
resulting from variations in school quality after admitting a student of a particular type. These 
multipliers are positive, and the higher they are the stronger stratification is, since the higher 
the impact of student characteristics on the marginal cost will be. Note that if the multipliers 
are equal to zero, then the marginal cost of admitting a student will only be determined by the 
number of students in a school. In other words, student characteristics will not have any effect 
and stratification according to ability and social status will not exist. This is very important 
for any empirical work based on this model. Some countries have comprehensive schooling 
(Finland) and stratification levels are weak, while others are more liberal (UK) and levels of 
stratification are expected to be relatively higher. Our theoretical model allows for such 
variations in stratification levels. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
The objective of this paper was to develop a theoretical model to study the empirical and 
econometric implications of stratification. For this I used the example of educational 
stratification of students between schools.  
 
The model clearly shows that the omission of some school characteristics generates 
endogeneity bias in multilevel estimations because these characteristics are the by-product of 
students’ attributes. The reverse is also true. The omission of student characteristics leads to 
endogeneity because these are correlated with the included school-level variables. Secondly, 
countries with different education systems may be affected differently by this bias due to 
varying levels of stratification and hence to variations in the strength of correlation between 
student and school variables. Finally, non-linear social peer effects were introduced in order 
to model the impact of social diversity within a school. The hypotheses identified in this 
model can be tested empirically, especially that multilevel data accounting for student and 
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school characteristics are available (e.g. PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS). Further, the theory developed 
in this paper can be extended to any economic phenomenon that exhibits stratification or 
nesting of smaller units within larger units (e.g. employees within firms, residents within 
neighbourhoods, etc).  
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